"Strong Supervision" or "Free Riding": How do Individual Blockholders Affect the Quality of Enterprise Patents
Fan Hanwen1,Zeng Fanhua2,3
（1.School of Economics,Shanxi University of Finance and Economics,Taiyuan 030006,China;2.School of Economics,Zhongnan University of Economics and Law,Wuhan 430083,China3.City College,Wuhan University of Science and Technology,Wuhan 430083,China）
范瀚文,曾繁华. “强监督”还是“搭便车”：自然人大股东如何影响企业专利质量[J]. 科技进步与对策, 2021, 38(10): 85-94.
Fan Hanwen,Zeng Fanhua. "Strong Supervision" or "Free Riding": How do Individual Blockholders Affect the Quality of Enterprise Patents. SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY PROGRESS AND POLICY, 2021, 38(10): 85-94.
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