|
|
Does Centralized Ownership Structure Affect Innovation of Information Technology Enterprises |
Gu Lulu,Zhang Kaige |
(School of Finance, Zhongnan University of Economics and Law, Wuhan 430073, China) |
|
|
Abstract Concentrate holdings is common in Chinese enterprises.Based on principal-principal agency theory, we investigate the impact of different Centralized Ownership and Non-executive Directors on innovation.Using the sample of Chinese listed enterprises in information technology sector in Osiris and CSMAR database, we found that enterprises with absolute centralized ownership are more efficient in innovation with conservative input and higher output, while the relative centralized ownership has a lower innovation efficiency with higher input and lower output.In the mechanistic study, we found that the "decision-making effect" of non-executive directors on innovation input does not exist, however, the "supervision effect" on innovation output process is significant.What’s more, the results on mediating effects show that non-executive directors have significant mediating effects.In the further analysis, we also found that duality can restrain the controlling shareholder's "tunneling" behavior in the relative centralized enterprises.Compared with non-family enterprises, family enterprises with relative centralized ownership have lower output.
|
Received: 07 September 2020
|
|
|
|
|
[1] CHEN V Z, LI J,SHAPIRO D M, et al.Ownership structure and innovation: an emerging market perspective[J].Asia Pac J Manag, 2014, 31(1):1-24.[2] 顾露露,岑怡,郭三,等.股权结构、价值链属性与技术创新——基于中国信息技术企业的实证分析[J].证券市场导报, 2015,15(10): 27-35.[3] 景奎,王磊,徐凤敏.产融结合、股权结构与公司投资效率[J].经济管理, 2019, 41(11): 174-192.[4] 石晓军,王骜然.独特公司治理机制对企业创新的影响——来自互联网公司双层股权制的全球证据[J].经济研究, 2017, 52(1): 149-164.[5] JOHNSON S,LA PORTA,LOPEZ-DE-SILANES, et al.Tunneling[J].American Economic Review, 2000, 90(2): 22-27.[6] FRIEDMAN E,JOHNSON S,MITTON T.Propping and tunneling[J].Journal of Comparative Economics, 2003, 31(4): 732-750.[7] 王敏,何杰.大股东控制权与上市公司违规行为研究[J].管理学报, 2020, 17(3): 447-455.[8] 刘胜强,刘星.股权结构对企业R&D投资的影响——来自制造业上市公司2002—2008年的经验证据[J].软科学, 2010, 24(7): 32-36.[9] 贾凯威,马成浩,赵丰义,等.不充分外部竞争环境下企业股权结构与创新关系再审视——基于非平衡面板数据分析[J].科技进步与对策, 2018, 35(20): 94-101.[10] LA PORTA R, LOPEZ-DE-SILANES F,SHLEIFER A.Corporate ownership around the world[J].The Journal of Finance, 1999, 54(2): 471-517.[11] 秦德智,邵慧敏,苏琳淳.技术创新对股权结构与企业绩效的中介效应——来自创业板上市制造企业的实证[J].科技进步与对策, 2019, 36(16): 77-83.[12] 隋静,蒋翠侠,许启发.股权制衡与公司价值非线性异质关系研究——来自中国A股上市公司的证据[J].南开管理评论, 2016, 19(1): 70-83.[13] 刘建华,李园园,段珅,等.董事会特征、创新投入与品牌价值——基于内生性视角的实证研究[J].管理评论, 2019, 31(12): 136-145.[14] 李井林,阳镇.董事会性别多元化、企业社会责任与企业技术创新——基于中国上市公司的实证研究[J].科学学与科学技术管理, 2019, 40(5): 34-51.[15] 李卿云,王行,吴晓晖.董事会国际化、地区廉洁程度与研发投资[J].管理科学, 2018, 31(5): 131-146.[16] 桂荷发,黄节根.非执行董事与股东—管理层代理冲突——兼论管理层权力与产权属性对非执行董事治理效应的影响[J].当代财经, 2016,37(12): 55-64.[17] 段云,王福胜,王正位.多个大股东存在下的董事会结构模型及其实证检验[J].南开管理评论, 2011, 14(1): 54-64.[18] 郑志刚,胡晓霁,黄继承.超额委派董事、大股东机会主义与董事投票行为[J].中国工业经济, 2019, 36(10): 155-174.[19] 祝继高,叶康涛,陆正飞.谁是更积极的监督者:非控股股东董事还是独立董事[J].经济研究, 2015, 50(9): 170-184.[20] 陈仕华,郑文全.公司治理理论的最新进展:一个新的分析框架[J].管理世界, 2010, 26(2): 156-166.[21] 衣凤鹏,徐二明,张晗.股权集中度与领导结构对连锁董事与企业社会责任关系的调节作用研究[J].管理学报, 2018, 15(9): 1359-1369.[22] LEE P M,O'NEILL.Ownership structures and R&D investments of U.S.and Japanese firms: agency and stewardship perspectives[J].The Academy of Management Journal, 2003, 46(2): 212-225.[23] DURAN P,KAMMERLANDER N,VAN ESSEN M, et al.Doing more with less: innovation input and output in family firms[J].Acad Manage J, 2016, 59(4): 1224-1264.[24] GOMEZ-MEJIA L R,CAMPBELL J T,MARTIN G, et al.Socioemotional wealth as a mixed gamble: revisiting family firm R&D investments with the behavioral agency model[J].Entrep Theory Pract, 2014, 38(6): 1351-1374.[25] CLAESSENS S,FAN J P H.Corporate governance in Asia: a survey[J].International Review of Finance, 2002, 3(2): 71-103.[26] 徐莉萍,辛宇,陈工孟.股权集中度和股权制衡及其对公司经营绩效的影响[J].经济研究, 2006,41(1): 90-100.[27] 刘红娟,陈永忠,刘红刚.大股东特征与董事会结构关系的实证分析[J].统计与决策, 2004,20(7): 34-35.[28] 郑丽,陈志军.母子公司人员嵌入、控制层级与子公司代理成本[J].经济管理, 2018, 40(10): 75-91.[29] 唐建新,李永华,卢剑龙.股权结构、董事会特征与大股东掏空——来自民营上市公司的经验证据[J].经济评论, 2013,34(1): 86-95.[30] HERMALIN B E,WEISBACH M S.Endogenously chosen boards of directors and their monitoring of the CEO[J].American Economic Review, 1998, 88(1): 96-118.[31] 谢绚丽,赵胜利.中小企业的董事会结构与战略选择——基于中国企业的实证研究[J].管理世界, 2011, 27(1): 101-111,188.[32] PENG M W.Outside directors and firm performance during institutional transitions[J].Strategic Management Journal, 2004, 25(5): 453-471.[33] 胡诗阳,陆正飞.非执行董事对过度投资的抑制作用研究——来自中国A股上市公司的经验证据[J].会计研究, 2015,36(11): 41-48,96.[34] LU J,WANG W.Managerial conservatism, board independence and corporate innovation[J].Journal of Corporate Finance, 2018, 48:1-16.[35] 胡元木,纪端.董事技术专长、创新效率与企业绩效[J].南开管理评论, 2017, 20(3): 40-52.[36] 王营,张光利.董事网络和企业创新:引资与引智[J].金融研究, 2018,39(6): 189-206.[37] 陈思,何文龙,张然.风险投资与企业创新:影响和潜在机制[J].管理世界, 2017, 33(1): 158-169.[38] WADHWA A, PHELPS C,KOTHA S.Corporate venture capital portfolios and firm innovation[J].J Bus Venturing, 2016, 31(1): 95-112.[39] 顾露露,蔡良,雷悦.家族治理、所有权变更与企业创新——基于中国家族企业的实证研究[J].管理科学, 2017, 30(2): 39-53.[40] BARON R M,KENNY D A.The moderator-mediator variable distinction in social psychological research: conceptual, strategic, and statistical considerations[J].Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1986, 51(6): 1173-1182.[41] 温忠麟,叶宝娟.中介效应分析:方法和模型发展[J].心理科学进展, 2014, 22(5): 731-745.[42] 刘少波,马超.经理人异质性与大股东掏空抑制[J].经济研究, 2016, 51(4): 129-145.[43] 李常洪,郭嘉琦,焦文婷,等.家族控制与企业创新投入——信息透明度的调节效应[J].科技进步与对策, 2018, 35(23): 106-112. |
|
|
|