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| Researh on Industrial Generic Technology R&D Outsourcing Contract and Influencing Factors with Government Supports |
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Abstract By building the threestage game model of generic technology R&D, this paper studies the R&D outsourcing contract with government supports which maximizes generic technology R&D output, and analyzes the effect factors of outsourcing contract. The result shows as follows: the optimal generic technology R&D outsourcing contract exists only when there are enough government budgets. The optimal contracts terms increases with government budget increases, which is forced to rise with enterprise retained earnings increases. The optimal input of enterprise's knowledge and technology is negatively correlated with the fixed R&D expenditure paid by government and positively with both the generic technology value coefficient and the income share from R&D. The optimal input of government supportive knowledge and technology is negatively correlated with the fixed R&D expenditure and unit input cost coefficient. The optimal enterprise input, which increases with the enhancement of enterprise R&D ability, is negatively correlated with the unit cost coefficient of government input and positively with the contribution coefficient of government input on R&D success. Finally, the paper puts forward some suggestions on implementation of generic technology R&D outsourcing contract from government budget, project prospects and supportive resources allocation.
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