Abstract Using sample of Chinese listed companies from 2006 to 2016, this study investigates the effect of ESOs and CEO power on corporate innovation .We find that both ESOs risk incentive (vega) and CEO power are positively correlated with corporate innovation respectively, but when CEO power and ESOs coexist, the powerful manager will control compensation contract to obtain rent more easily , thus give up risky innovation.So the negative synergistic effect of ESOs and CEO power will discourage corporate innovation.The study adds to literatures on corporate innovation, manager power and top manager equity incentive.The result of the study has certain reference significance that it is helpful to improve organizational innovation competence and corporate governance.
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Fund:基金项目:北京市哲学社会科学基金项目(16YJC045);北京市哲学社会科学规划研究基地一般项目(14JDJGB044) |
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