Research on the System and Mechanism of Civil-Military Integration from the Perspective of Principal-Agent
Hu Yuxuan1,Zeng Li1,Deng Jianbin2
1.School of Humanities and Social Sciences,National University of Defense Technology;2.Supportting Department, National University of Defense Technology, Changsha 410074,China
胡宇萱,曾立,邓建斌. 委托代理视角下军民融合体制机制研究[J]. 科技进步与对策, 2017, 34(6): 117-121.
Hu Yuxuan,Zeng Li,Deng Jianbin. Research on the System and Mechanism of Civil-Military Integration from the Perspective of Principal-Agent. SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY PROGRESS AND POLICY, 2017, 34(6): 117-121.
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